Abstract

Live-streaming advertisingis a rapidly emerging trend in e-commerce. Both Amazon and Alibaba have usedthis new marketing tool to sequentially recommend different products toconsumers. In this talk, we use a mechanism design framework to demonstrate howa live-streaming platform can improve its advertising revenue relative totraditional position auctions. We show that the revenue loss from neglectinginformation provision can be arbitrarily large. However, solving for theoptimal mechanism is NP-hard. We thus develop several heuristics with constantperformance bounds relative to an upper bound on optimal revenue. We attributethe effectiveness of information provision to its discriminatory role inserving heterogeneous advertisers. The impacts of information provision on thepayment/allocation rules as well as advertisers’ utilities are intricate andstudied in detail.

Time

12月15日（星期二）10:00-11:30

Speaker

Mr. Pin Gao is afourth-year PhD student in the Department of Industry Engineering &Decision Analytics, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (HKUST).Prior to this, he earned a MPhil and a BSc both in Physics from HKUST and WuhanUniversity, respectively. His current research interests include revenuemanagement, multi-armed bandits, and algorithmic game theory.

Venue

betvictot官网102室